Lee M. Stephens and Gwen Stephens v. Myrtle Burton, Jack E. Burton, Duke C. Jones, John E. Burton and Lewis Dillree : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Lee M. Stephens and Gwen Stephens v. Myrtle
Burton, Jack E. Burton, Duke C. Jones, John E.
Burton and Lewis Dillree : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph Novak; La Var E. Stark; Attorneys for Respondents.
S. Rex Lewis; Howard, Lewis, and Peterson; Attorneys for Defendants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Lee M. Stephens and Gwen Stephens v. Myrtle Burton, Jack E. Burton, Duke C. Jones, John E. Burton and Lewis Dillree,
No. 14066.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/142
pr 
IN THE SUPREME COURT i. ' 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEE M. STEPHENS and 
GWEN STEPHENS, 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
vs. 
MYRTLE BURTON, JACK E. 
BURTON, DUKE C. JONES, 
JOHN E. BURTON and LEWIS 
DILLREE, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 
14,066 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
MORGAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE CALVIN GOULD, JUDGE 
S. REX LEWIS, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Appellants, Myrtle Burton, 
Jack E. Burton and John 
E. Burton 
JOSEPH NOVAK 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
LA VAR E. STARK 
2651 Washington Boulevard, 
Suite #10 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Respondents 
F I L E 
AUG?-1975 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEiMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 5 
THE BENEFICIAL USE OF WATER AT THE 
TIME LAND IS CONVEYED IS THE COR-
RECT MEASURE OF WATER RIGHTS. 
POINT II 13 
THE WATER RIGHTS WHICH WERE BENE-
FICIALLY USED UPON THE LAND CON-
VEYED BY STEPHENS WERE APPURTENANT 
TO THE LAND. 
POINT III 16 
WATER RIGHTS WHICH ARE APPURTEN-
ANT TO LAND PASS WHENEVER THE LAND 
IS CONVEYED UNLESS THE WATER RIGHTS 
ARE EXPRESSLY RESERVED. 
CONCLUSION 22 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
PAGE 
78 Am.Jur.2d, Waters, §242. 17 
Anderson v. Hamson, 50 Utah 149, 167 P. 254 
(1917) 18 
Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Co. v. Cook, 73 
Utah 383, 274 P. 454 (1929) 5 
Big Goose and Beaver Ditch Co. v. Wallop, 
382 P.2d 388 (Wyo. 1963) 15 
Black v. Johanson, 81 Utah 410, 18 P.2d 901 
(1933) 21 
Cortella v. Salt Lake City, 93 Utah 236, 
72 P.2d 630 (1937) 
Petrofesa v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
RR. Co., 110 Utah 109, 169 P.2d 808 
(1946) 
Richfield Cottonwood Irr. Co. v. City of 
Richfield, 84 Utah 107, 34 P.2d 945 
(1934) 
Salt River Valley Water Users Ass'n v. 
v. Kovacovich, 3 Ariz.App. 28, 411 
P.2d 201 (1966) 
St. Louis-New Orleans May. Co. v. Hynicka, 
36 Ohio App. 94, 172 N.E. 287 
Thompson v. McKinney, 91 Utah 89, 63 P.2d 
1056 (1937) 
Zolezzi v. Jackson, 297 P.2d 1081 (Nev. 1956) 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, §73-1-11 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEE M. STEPHENS and 
GWEN STEPHENS, 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
vs. 
MYRTLE BURTON, JACK E. BURTON, 
DUKE C. JONES, JOHN E. BURTON, 
and LEWIS DILLREE, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. ) 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal arising from an action to determine owner-
ship to rights in water flowing from the Broudth spring in Morgan 
County, Utah, and also an action for injunctory relief and for 
damages caused by the severance of a pipe stopping water flowing 
to a home. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried on'June 20 and 21, 1974, before the Hon-
orable Calvin Gould, sitting without a jury. The only issues tried 
at that time related to ownership of the water rights. All issues 
as to injunctive relief and damages from cutting the water pipe 
were reserved for trial at a later date. 
The Court found as to ownership of water rights that after 
certain conveyances by the Stephens, the maximum water rights ob-
tained by appellant, John E. Burton, was an irrigation right for 
0.34 acres of land and for the domestic requirements of five per-
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sons; that the maximum water rights obtained by appellants, Myrtle 
Burton and Jack E. Burton, were a stock watering right of 0.139 
gallons per minute for the stock watering requirements of six cows 
and two horses; and that the respondents, Lee M. Stephens and Gwen 
Stephens, retained an irrigation right for 0.502 acres, a domes-
tic right for four persons and also retained a stock watering 
right for the equivalent of 22 cattle. 
In summary, the Court found, as to water ownership rights to 
the Broudth spring, after the two parcels of land were conveyed 
from Stephens to Burtons, that the Stephens still retained owner-
ship of 56.6% of the one-half interest in right No. 342 of the 
"Weber River Decree" and the appellants Burtons collectively are 
the owners of only 43.4% of the onehalf interest in right No. 342. 
It is from this finding as to water ownership rights that the ap-
pellants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek reversal of the Court's ruling as to the 
ownership of the disputed water rights after the two conveyances 
contending that the respondents completely divested themselves, by 
warranty deed, of whatever remaining water rights they had in the 
Broudth spring. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This dispute involves the ownership rights of the use of wa-
ters from a spring in Morgan County known as Broudth spring. The 
water rights in question are evidenced by No. 342, confirmed by 
the "Weber River Decree" dated June 2, 1937. 
This dispute arose as a consequence of the Stephens1 selling 
two parcels of property. On one parcel was the Stephens' old home. 
This parcel, containing .39 acres, was conveyed to John E. and 
Sheryn Burton, for which a warranty deed was given on June 15, 
1971, without a reservation of any water rights to the Stephens 
as grantors. (R.23) Contemporaneously with selling their home 
to the Burtons, the Stephens also sold some acreage to the south 
of their old home to the Barnetts without a reservation of any 
water rights. (Tr. 84), The third parcel, containing 3.16 acres, 
was conveyed to Myrtle and Jack E. Burton by warranty deed on 
August 20, 1972. (R. 24) This deed expressly "included in the 
sale is a stockwater right in the present pipeline crossing the 
property." The Stephens, as in the other deeds, failed to re-
serve any water rights. Stephens testified he orally intended to 
reserve water rights. (Tr. 72, 73) Mr. Stephens owned a total of 
17.85 acres prior to the above two conveyances and he later built 
a new house just south of the Burtons on part of this original 
acreage and in December, 1971, moved into his new home. (Tr. 57, 
65) The Stephens had drilled a well in connection with building 
this new house in order to provide domestic water. (Tr. 66) 
A rough schematic drawing of the Bradt spring and the single 
pipeline which served the above properties follows: 
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As the drawing indicates, a single pipeline about four feet 
below the surface (Tr. 4) runs from the Broudth spring to the Ste-
phens' new home. In August, 1972, the Stephens permanently hook-
ed themselves up to this pipeline. (Tr. 67) 
On May 27, 1973, Louis Dillree, acting under the direction 
of another, severed the pipeline where it crossed the Burton prop-
erty, thereby depriving the Stephens1 new home of water from the 
Broudth spring. The Stephens then unsuccessfully sought the issu-
ance of an injunction compelling the defendants to replace the 
severed pipeline. 
The Burtons and defendant Jones justified the severance of 
the pipeline by alleging they are the owners of all water rising 
in the single pipeline from the Broudth spring across their prop-
erty. The Burtons contend they have complete ownership of all 
water rights because on June 15, 1971, the Stephens deeded to 
the appellant, John E. Burton, all the Stephens1 interest in cul-
inary water from the Broudth spring and also on August 20, 1972, 
the Stephens deeded all of their remaining water rights to the ap-
pellants, Myrtle Burton and Jack E. Burton. 
On the contrary, respondents Stephens contend they still 
own a portion of the water rights in Broudth spring even after 
the above two conveyances to John Burton on June 15, 1971, and to 
Myrtle and Jack E. Burton on August 20, 1972. The trial court 
held that the Stephens, after the above conveyances, owned a por-
tion of the water rights to Broudth spring. The trial court held 
the two conveyances had not completely divested the Stephens of 
all water rights in the Broudth spring. The appellants contend 
such a finding is reversible error. 
POINT I 
THE BENEFICIAL USE OF WATER AT THE TIME LAND IS CONVEYED IS 
THE CORRECT MEASURE OF WATER RIGHTS. 
This appeal involves a question of the ownership of water 
rights after certain conveyances of .39 and 3.16 acres of land 
from the Stephens to the Burtons. The correct measure of these 
water rights prior to the above two conveyances is the beneficial 
use of water at the time of the conveyances. As statutory author-
ity for such an assertion, appellants cite Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended, §73-1-3, which states: 
Beneficial use basis of right to use.— 
Beneficial use shall be the basis, the mea-
sure and the limit of all rights to the use 
of water in this state. 
This theme of essential, beneficial use has been reiterated over 
and over again in the many water rights decisions of the Utah Sup-
reme Court. In Richfield Cottonwood Irr. Co. v. City of Rich-
field, 84 Utah 107, 34 P.2d 945 (1934), the court stated: 
We have a statute which provides that 
"beneficial use shall be the basis, the 
measure and the limit of all rights to the 
use of water in this state.11 Rev. St. Utah 
1933, 100-1-3. Such has been the law in 
this jurisdiction ever since the territory 
of Utah was organized. This court has in 
numerous cases had occasion to apply that 
law. Among such cases are Sowards v. Mea-
gher, 37 Utah 212, 108 P. 1112; Salt Lake 
City v. Gardner, 39 Utah 30, 114 P. 147; 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Shurt-
liff, 49 Utah 569, 164 P. 856; Cleary v. 
Daniels, 50 Utah 494, 167 P. 820; Gunnison 
Irr. Co. v. Gunnison Highland Canal Co., 
52 Utah 347, 174 P. 852; Mt Olivet Cemetery 
Ass'n v. Salt Lake City, 65 Utah 193, 235 
P. 8 76; and Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Co. 
v. Cook, 73 Utah 383, 274 P. 454. IcL_ at 
949. 
Also see Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Co. v. Cook, 73 Utah 383, 274 
P. 454 (1929), in which the the Utah Supreme Court said: 
"Beneficial use shall be the basis, the 
measure and the limit of all rights to the 
use of water in this state-11 Laws Utah 1919, 
chapter 67, §3. 
This is a cardinal principle of the law 
of water rights. Id. at 456. • 
The water from Broudth spring, prior to the conveyances by 
the Stephens, was used on the 3.16 acres in the following manner 
as Jack Burton testified (Tr. 220): 
A. Well, this looked like it was origin-
ally a hay barn typical ranch in this area, and 
had been modified to include a cattle shelter 
and numerous corrals, five, I think. And it 
was used as a feedlot. I counted the cattle on 
several occasions, and there were in the neigh-
borhood of thirty-five or forty. 
Q. All on this piece of property that you 
purchased? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. „. And the size of the mangers and the 
shelter, did you formulate an opinion as to how 
many cattle this area would accommodate? 
A. I would quess fifty; and it is our in-
tention, of course, to build a herd of this size. 
Q. How long prior to when you purchased 
the property did you see thrity-five to forty 
head of cattle on it? • 
A. Oh, whenever I happened to be visiting 
my boy why I would step out and just peruse, take 
a look at the area and see how many were there 
-co see if it looked like it would accommodate 
what we wanted. 
Q. And was that the number of cattle that 
the area would accommodate, was that one of the 
prime factors in your determining to buy the 
property? 
A. It is strictly a feed yard. I don!t 
think it would sustain a goat otherwise, in an 
area like this, you have to buy land when it is 
available. We bought the house when it was 
available We bought some property, or John 
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bought some property, or Woodrow Barnett bought 
property south of the house when it was avail-
able. We bought the barn when it was available, 
and we are still looking for property. 
Q. When you purchased the property and 
received the deed, it specifically has provi-
sion for water, does it not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How much water did you intend that 
you would receive with that deed? 
A. Whatever had been used prior to that 
time. 
Q. What was the prior use? 
A. It has been stated that there was be-
tween sixty and seventy head of cattle or ani-
mals kept in that place. 
Q. And you intended to acquire water 
enough to take care of that many animals? 
A* Yes. 
Q. That's what you thought the deed pro-
vided? " 
A. Yes, sir. 
Appellants object to the Court's Finding No. 5 (R. 62). 
Since there was no evidence to support the finding concerning 
rhe extent of the appurtenancy prior to deeding the 3.16 acres 
that related to 6 cows and 2 horses. The evidence before the 
Court was that 60 head of cattle had been watered on this prop-
erty conveyed to Myrtle and Jack Burton. (Tr. 220, 96, 83) 
There could only be two houses hooked on the waterline flow-
ing from Broudth spring. Rex Larsen from the State Engineer's 
office testified (Tr. 181, 183) that a flow of .03 second feet 
is sufficient for only two families. 
Q. All right. Is there anything in 
that Brown Decree or anything else that you 
' -7-
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use as a guide that you refer to that flow 
is merely to one home or to two homes, the 
total right? 
• , • . ' . • • • • 
A. The maps show two homes, and the 
proposed determination shows eighteen per-
sons , which would be in balance. And there 
was large families in those days. 
. . . 
A* The only basis we have to go on 
is the maps and, of course, the Brown Book; 
the maps show two homes and the Brown Book 
shows eighteen persons. 
John Burton testified (Tr. 206) Stephens told him .the line 
"to the best of his knowledge was for two houses." Mr. Waldron 
indicated there could only be two houses on the line. (Tr. 95, 
113) Mr. Jones also understood there could be only two houses 
hooked on. Mr. Stephens testified (Tr. 76): 
Q. Now, Mr. Stephens, when was the 
first time that any problems developed be-
tween you and any of the Burtons or the 
Joneses with respect to your use of the 
water from this pipeline? 
A. Generally the — I was told by the 
Joneses time and time again that there could 
only be two houses hooked on to the line, 
whether or not this was the problem or trouble 
that you are outlining, maybe it simply pre-
ceeded it. But I was told that that was the 
case. And I agreed. 
-8-
i 
i 
i 
i 
i Eighteen persons would be the equivalent of two families. Among those who used the waters flowing from Broudth spring, 
it was commonly understood that only two homes could be hooked I 
on to the line. Stephens so testified: (Tr. 115) 
i 
i 
A. I investigated the water for pro-
bably two years before I did anything. I 
simply didn't hook the water on to the house 
because I was told over and over again that 
there could be only two houses hooked on to 
the, or two houses hooked on to the water • 
line, I am sorry, so I didn't do anything I 
to change the system that I had run up to 
the house. 
i 
Stephens also testified (Tr. 77) there was the problem of 
this "two-house thing." 
Only two homes, for culinary water, could be hooked onto 
this line is evidence that when Stephens sold their home on the 
.39 acre parcel that the intent was to convey all remaining cul-
inary water rights from Broudth spring without any reservation. 
Such an intent of the parties is also supported by Stephens' 
drilling a well to supply his new home with water and the lack 
of any reservation of culinary water rights in the warranty deed 
conveying the property. 
The only parcels irrigated with water from the Broudth spring 
were the parcel conveyed by Stephens to Barnett; the .39 acre con-
veyed by Stephens to John Burton; and the acres conveyed to Jack 
and Myrtle Burton. The irrigation rights appurtenant to the 
Barnett property were all conveyed. The only remaining irriga-
tion rights were appurtenant to the .39 acres and it was the in-
tent of Stephens to convey these irrigation rights. (Tr. 73) 
Q. Did you intend to convey any of 
your irrigation right under the conveyance 
marked Exhibit D? 
A. I knew there was a small garden 
area back of the home where a little gar-
den was kept, and I intend — I would have 
to say honestly that I intended to convey 
whatever water went to serve that too. 
If there were any irrigation rights remaining, they were con-
veyed in the deed to Jack and Myrtle Burton. Thus, whatever irri-
gation rights remained in Broudth spring were conveyed by the Ste-
p h e n s . '.'•'-. 
After the water pipe was severed, stopping the flow to res-
pondents, respondents made a motion for a temporary injunction. 
-9-
A hearing was held July 5, 1974, before Judge John F. Wahlquist. ^ 
In order to determine whether an injunction should issue, it was "* 
necessary to determine the status of the water rights after the I 
conveyances by Stephens* Judge Wahlquist found (Tr. of Prelim-
inary Injunction 83,84): 
I find as follows: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
That the plaintiffs1 predecessors in in-
terest owned the water right which has been 
referred to as .03 second feet of flow, and 
that this was to water on .17 (1.7) acres of 
land to be used for domestic purposes; that 
there is no evidence before me on which I 
can make a determination of which of the ori-
ginal Waldron landowners would receive water 
shares. So for the purpose of this proceed- • 
ing alone I presume that each was to receive I 
one half which would be .015 in flow. This 
would I find on the testimony of the State En-
gineer's representative that this would be the 
approximate amount of water necessary to sup-
port a home with an ordinary family size such 
as Barns and gardens and no other waters above 
this figure. 
Number two, that the plaintiff sold the • 
house in question to the one defendant and at * I 
the time he sold the water clearly hooked up 
to this water system, and it would be implied 
in law a transfer of the water right necessary I 
for this home; that further the earnest money I 
contract evidence an intention to sell water 
necessary for this home. I 
I also find there was a discussion invol-
ving the sale or exchange of water and neces- i 
sity for water and also water necessity in I 
the finishing of the home, and that plaintiff 
orally promised to make a quit claim deed to 
the purchaser of the home for $17,000.00, to I 
the water; that so far as I am able to deter- I 
mine the vast majority of the .015 water 
right was sold in this transaction; that then I 
I find that there had been a further sale of | 
water right to this particular defendant's 
father when the barn was sold, when it was i 
transferred. I believe that this would wipe 
out the water right. That there has also 
been other sales of water coming off this 
which would further diminish the water right. 
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At this time I see no convincing evi-
dence at all in this case that this plain-
tiff owned any water in this spring. I also 
find that there is no evidence of irrepar-
able damage if the water is not turned on 
and that he had adequate temporary water 
supply. (emphasis added) 
In the later decision appealed from, Judge Calvin Gould did 
not base his decision on the water usage at the time of the con-
veyances, but rather his decision was based on the usage after 
the two conveyances. For example, in his Findings of Fact No. 5 
(R. 62), Judge Gould finds: 
5. The maximum water rights convey-
ed by plaintiffs to defendants Myrtle Bur-
ton and Jack E. Burton under the Warranty 
Deed dated August 20, 1972 was a stockwa-
tering right of 0.139 gallons per minute for 
the stockwatering requirements of 6 cows and 
2 horses. 
Such a finding was based on John Burton's testimony (Tr. 37) as 
to his usage after the conveyances. 
Q. Can you tell us, Mr. Burton, the 
maximum nujnber of stock that your father, 
Jack E. Burton, has had on this 3.16 acres 
since he owned it? 
A. Well, my dad hasn't actually owned 
the stock, I have managed that property for 
him. 
Q. Have you had any stock on the 3.16 
acres? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Of your own? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What have been the maximum number of 
head of stock, livestock, that have been on 
the 3.16 acres since your father owned it, and 
since you have been managing it? 
A. Total, or at one time? 
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Q. At one time. 
A* Six head of cattle and three horses. i 
Q. Six head of cattle. Would they be dif- 1 
ferent or the same as the six head of cattle 
that you told us about as being on your .39? 
A. No, I didn't. 
The balance of the property not conveyed by the Stephens was 
so steep and sagebrush-covered that it had never been watered. 
(Tr. 85) Mr. Stephens testified the balance of the dry hillside 
had never been watered. (Tr. 91) (Inj. Tr. 25, 13) Stephens also 
testified (Tr. 100) that the only land conducive to irrigation 
was land at the base of the hill. The land was so steep Ste-
phens had to make a cut in the hill in order to construct his 
new house. (Tr. 102) 
The Stephens retained certain land upon which they built a 
new house after the above conveyances. The correct measure of 
;
. -12-
I 
I 
A. They would be the same cattle. 
Beneficial use, not the total acreage, is the correct mea-
sure of the extent of. water rights. Water rights are not pro-
rated to the total acreage but rather such rights are only appur- I 
tenant to land actually watered. The only part of the total acre-
age owned by the Stephens to which the water had been used bene-
ficially was the Woodrow Barnett property and the two parcels 
purchased by the Burtons. See John Burton's testimony. (Tr. 217, 
218) 
i 
i 
i 
Q. Mr. Burton, did you, at the time you 
were negotiating for purchase of the Woodrow I 
Barnett property, that which you purchased and • 
that which Jack Burton purchased, did you ever 
see any of this water put to any beneficial use 
whatsoever other than on those three tracts of 
property? 
i 
i 
i 
i 
Stephens1 water rights are not the acres retained after the con-
veyances, but rather the correct measure is the beneficial use 
of the water on the .39 and 3.16 parcels of land at the time of 
the conveyances to the Burtons. 
The water rights were not inseparably attached to the whole 
piece of property owned by the Stephens, but rather water rights 
are restricted to only the portions to which water had actually 
been put to beneficial use. The Stephens thus retained no water 
rights in the steep sagebrush acreage which they retained at the 
time of the conveyances. 
In the instant case, the question is simply how the water 
was used prior to the conveyances. The only possible measure of 
the extent of the water right was the clear use to which respon-
dents had put the water prior to the conveyances to the Burtons. 
At the time the conveyances were made, it was clear and visible 
to all the parties which land was being benefited. The water, 
prior to the conveyances, was used exclusively on that portion of 
respondents' land which was conveyed to the Burtons. Up to 60 
head of cattle were watered on the land that was ultimately con-
veyed to Myrtle and Jack Burton. It was with the expectation 
that Myrtle and Jack Burton would be able to use the land to, at 
least, the same extent as respondents had (Tr. 220) that they pur-
chased the land from respondents. Beneficial use prior to the 
conveyances determines the water rights. Such prior use was es-
tablished by testimony at trial. 
POINT II 
THE WATER RIGHTS WHICH WERE BENEFICIALLY USED UPON THE LAND 
CONVEYED BY STEPHENS WERE APPURTENANT TO THE LAND. 
-13- • . 
It is a general principle, well settled in Utah, that water 
rights which are appurtenant to the land shall pass with the land 
unless expressly reserved. It must be determined, therefore, whe-
ther the water rights used on the .39 and 3.16 acres were appur-
tenant to these particular parcels conveyed. Appurtenance is de-
fined as "a thing belonging to another thing as principal and 
which passes as incident to the principal thing." St. Louis-New 
Orleans Nav. Co. v. Hynicka, 36 Ohio App. 94, 172 N.E. 287. 
Whether water rights are appurtenant depends on whether 
the rights are an incident necessary to the enjoyment of the land 
and whether the rights were used specifically for the benefit of 
the land in question. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Cortella v. Salt Lake City, 93 
Utah 236, 72 P.2d 630 (1937), stated that whether a water right 
is appurtenant depends upon usage. 
Before Cortella can rely on owhership of a 
water right as an appurtenance to his land, he 
must first show that such right was an appur-
tenance, one essential of which is that water 
right was in fact used upon said land. Whether 
a water right is an appurtenance involves a 
question of fact and depends upon the circum-
stances surrounding each particular case. Id. 
at 640 and 641. (emphasis added) 
The Nevada Supreme Court, in Zolezzi v. Jackson, 297 P.2d 
1081 (Nev. 1956), discussed the question of whether water was 
appurtenant to land upon which it was used thus: 
11
 [T]he very right itself, relating as it 
does to the land upon which it is applied, al-
though in a sense incorporeal, nevertheless, by 
reason of its application, becomes an integral 
part of the freehold. The water and the land 
to which it is applied become so interrelated 
and dependent on each other in order to con-
stitute a valid appropriation that the former 
-14-
becomes by reason of necessity appurtenant to 
the latter." [Emphasis supplied*] Such would 
appear to be the universally recognized law of 
waters in the arid western states. Id. at 
1082. (emphasis added) 
Also see Big Goose and Beaver Ditch Co. v. Wallop, 382 P.2d 388 
(Wyo. 1963), in which the Wyoming Supreme Court stated: 
In January of 1894, the supreme court in 
the case of Frank v. Hicks, 4 Wyo. 502, 35 P. 
475, 1025, made a significant decision where-
in it was said at 35 P 484: 
"* * *a water right becomes appurten-
ant to the land upon which the water 
is used* * * Under our system there 
is no such thing as a water right in 
gross. The application of the water 
to some beneficial purpose is absolu-
tely requisite. And a water right 
for purposes of irrigation can no 
more exist, where there is no land to 
be irrigated, than can an easement for 
the passage of light to ancient win-
dows exist where there never were any 
windows. And this would seem to be of 
the very essence of appurtenances. 
Where one thing depends upon another 
for its existence, it would seem en-
tirely proper to call it appurtenant 
to that thing upon which it so depends." 
Id. at 392 
Also see Salt River Valley Water Users1 Assyn v. Kovacovich, 3 
Ariz.App. 28, 411 P.2d 201 (1966), in which the Arizona Court 
stated: 
Sloser v. Salt River Valley Canal Co. 
[7 Ariz. 376, 65 P. 332], supra; Gould v. 
Maricopa Canal Co., 8 Ariz. 429, 76 P. 
598; Brockman v. Grand Canal Co. , 8 Ariz. 
451, 76 P. 602; Tattersfield v. Putnam, 45 
Ariz. 156, 41 P.2d 228; Olsen v. Union Can-
al & Irr. Co., 58 Ariz. 306, 119 P.2d 569. 
The holding in all of these cases is to the 
effect that a water right is attached to 
the land on which it is beneficially used 
and becomes appurtenant thereto, and that 
the right is not in any individual or own-
er of the land. It is in no sence a float-
ing right, nor can the right, once having 
attached to a particular piece of land, be 
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made to do duty to any other land/ with 
certain exceptions, e.g., where the land 
is washed away. Id. at 203. 
In Thompson v. McKinney, 91 Utah 89, 63 P.2d 1056 (1937), the 
Utah Supreme Court defines appurtenant rights by quoting its own 
previous decisions thus: 
This court gave the following defini-
tion in Holley Milling Co. v. Salt Lake & 
Jordan M. & E. Co., 58 Utah 149, 197 P. 
731, 736: 
"Again, the legal import of the phrase 
'appurtenances, rights and privileges, 
thereto belonging,1 as is well under-
stood, includes all those appurtenan-
ces, etc., which are used in direct 
connection with the real estate con-
veyed. In some instances more, and 
in some others less, is thereby con-
veyed, depending entirely upon what 
easements, rights, and privileges are 
used in connection with the real es-
tate conveyed.11 (emphasis added) Id. 
at 1060. 
The two tracts purchased by the Burtons were of little value I 
unless water from Broudth spring was utilized on these tracts of 
land. The two parcels purchased were both arid and unproductive 
without water rights. The reason the Burtons purchased the prop-
erty was to secure the water. (Tr. 210) These two tracts of land 
were entirely dependent upon the water being beneficially used upon 
them and the water was beneficially used upon only these two tracts, 
therefore, the water rights were appurtenant to these particular 
tracts of land. Under the evidence before the trier of fact, the 
water rights in dispute were appurtenant to the land conveyed. 
POINT III 
WATER RIGHTS WHICH ARE APPURTENANT TO LAND PASS WHENEVER THE 
LAND IS CONVEYED UNLESS THE WATER RIGHTS ARE EXPRESSLY RESERVED. 
Water rights have been classified generally as real estate. 
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The water right itself is treated as an incorporeal hereditament 
and is real property. See Cortella v. Salt Lake City/ supra. 
The water rights disputed in the case were appurtenant to the land. 
Water rights which are appurtenant as a general principle pass un-
der a deed of conveyance unless expressly reserved. See 73 Am.Jur. 
'2d,' Waters, §242. 
It is a general principle that water rights 
which are appurtenant to land pass under a deed 
of conveyance of such land, unless expressly re-
served. Thus, in the absence of anything indica-
ting an intention to sever the right to use the 
V water from the land, a conveyance of land will 
pass a water right which is plainly attached to 
the land and visibly in use at the time of the 
conveyance. The water rights which pass on a 
conveyance of land as appurtenant thereto are 
not limited to those absolutely necessary to 
the enjoyment of the property conveyed; it 
is sufficient if full enjoyment of the prop-
erty cannot be had without them. The inci-
dents which pass as appurtenant must, however, 
be "open and visible," from which fact the know-
ledge of their existence by the grantor is a 
natural inference. 
The Utah water rights statute, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, §73-1-11, codifies this principle by providing that an 
appurtenant water right passes to the grantee of the land to 
which it was appurtenant; but that the water right, or any part 
thereof, may be reserved by the grantor in express terms in the 
conveyance or it may be separately conveyed. See Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953 as amended, §73-1-11: 
Appurtenant waters—Use as passing under 
conveyance.—A right to the use of water ap-
purtenant :to land shall pass to the grantee 
of such land, and, in cases where such right 
has been exercised in irrigating different 
parcels of land at different times, such 
right shall pass to the grantee of any parcel 
of land on which such right was exercised next 
preceding the time of the execution of any con-
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veyance thereof; subject, however, in all 
cases to payment by the grantee in any such 1 
conveyance of all amounts unpaid on any assess- 1 
ment then due upon any such right; provided, 
that any such right to the use of water, or any • 
part thereof, may be reserved by the grantor I 
in any such conveyance by making such reserva-
tion in express terms in such conveyance, or 
it may be seaprately conveyed. I 
It is well settled case law in Utah that water rights that 
are appurtenant shall pass with the land unless expressly reserv- I 
ed. In Cortella, supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated: i 
Under our statute, section 100-1-11, 
R.S. Utah 1933, a conveyance of land pass- ' 
es an appurtenant water right unless the I 
same is expressly reserved. This has been • 
the statutory rule at least as far back as 
1888. See Snyder v. Murdock, 20 Utah 419, I 
59 P. 91; Comp. Laws Utah 1888, §2783; R.S. | 
Utah 1898, §1281. IdL_ at 635. 
A deed in statutory form is effective to transfer all appur- I 
tenant water rights unless water rights are expressly reserved in 
the deed. Anderson v. Hamson, 50 Utah 149, 167 P. 254 (1917); • 
also see Petrofesa v. Denver & Rio Grande Western RR Co., 110 :j 
Utah 109, 169 P.2d 808 (1946), in which the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
A warranty deed conveys the fee simple 
title "together with all the appurtenances, I 
rights and privileges thereunto belonging," ' 
by force of Sec. 78-1-11, U.C.A. 1943, un-
less some rights are reserved by the terms I 
of the conveyance. Id. at 810. | 
In Thompson, supra, the mortgagor showed that in several « 
previous transactions relating to a given tract of land, he had 
expressly mentioned the water whenever it was contended that both 
the land and the water were included. He urged that this, plus 
the failure to mention water in the mortgage, evidenced an inten-
tion to reserve water rights from the effect of the particular 
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mortgage. The court said that the evidence of such other trans-
actions, all expressly including water, did not constitute suffi-
cient evidence of an intention to reserve the water from the land 
mortgaged. In the instant case, there is absolutely no evidence 
the Stephens reserved any water rights. 
The measure of an appurtenant water right is thus the use 
to which it was put. It is clear from both case law and statu-
tory law that the measure of a right which is appurtenant is the 
amount and type of use employed by the grantor at the time of 
conveyance. Which land a water right is appurtenant to is deter-
mined by the property the water was beneficially used upon prior 
to the conveyance. The question in the instant case, therefore, 
is how were the two parcels conveyed by the Stephens to the Bur-
tons used prior to being conveyed. Stephens testified as to 
usage (Tr. 96) that: 
Q. I think you have testified earlier 
that in connection with that operation you 
had between sixty and seventy animals on that 
area, at least the area of the barn which Jack 
Burton has now at least sometime during that 
period, isn't that correct? 
A. Well, yes, on that and other land. 
Of course, they weren't confined. 
Q. But in fact the barn and feeding area 
is where in fact they fed for the most part, 
isn't that true? 
A. Yes, where the feed was supplemented 
for them, yes. 
Q. Yes. And so you were aware that 
that's what that area was used for, is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
The intention of the parties also determines whether a water 
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right is appurtenant to the land. The question of intention is to 
be drawn from the deed or if the deeds are silent, as in this case, 
to be drawn from the surrounding circumstances, and the acts of 
the parties. The testimony and acts of the parties in the instant 
case all indicate an intent to convey all water rights appurtenant 
to both parcels. John Burton testified (Tr. 53, 231, 234) that 
Stephens said, "He knew he had no claim to the water, but that he 
was not going to disconnect that line." John Burton also testi-
fied (Tr. 206) that Stephens: 
. . .indicated that he was going to drill a 
well. And I—he went on, he expounded, he 
said because he couldn't legally hook onto 
the spring, that's to the best of his know-
ledge, it was for two houses- And that he 
would have to drill a well for his use. 
John Burton also testified (Tr. 211) as follows: 
Q. Now, Mr. Burton, after you had acquir-
ed your home and Mr. Barnett had acquired the 
approximately three acres to the south, and af-
\ ter your father and grandmother had acquired the 
approximately three acres on the north, what 
water — what was your intention as to what Ste-
phens water you had acquired? 
A. It was my understanding that we had 
acquired substantially all of the water. 
Q. Was it your understanding that he had 
any water left after those transactions? 
A. No, I didn't think he had any water 
left after those transactions. 
John Burton testified (Tr. 54) that the reason Stephens drill-
ed a well was "that he didn't have any right to water for his new 
home and that is why he was drilling an 8-inch well." Measured 
by both the intention of the parties and the beneficial use of 
the water at the time of the conveyances, the water rights were 
appurtenant to both parcels conveyed by the Stephens. 
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It is the general principal that water rights which are ap-
purtenant to land pass under a deed of covneyance of such land 
unless expressly reserved. See Black v. Johanson, 81 Utah 410, 
18 P.2d 901 (1933), in which the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The law is well settled in this juris-
diction that a deed to land in statutory form 
without reservation of the water conveys what-
ever right the grantor has to the water ap-
purtenant to the land. Anderson v. Harrison, 
50 Utah 151, 167 P. 254. Id^ at 902. 
The respondents, to determine the water rights, look first 
to the decree (Tr. 76), however, the Weber River Decree Right No. 
342 does not determine the water rights between appellants and 
respondents. On the contrary, the documents, determinative of 
their respective water rights, are the deed delivered to the 
grantee, John Burton, on June 15, 1971, and the other deed of con-
veyance delivered to grantees, Myrtle and Jack Burton, on August 
29, 1972. As to determining water rights, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended, §73-1-11, is controlling not a water decree. 
The appellant, John E. Burton's, title to water rights is 
derivative and is derived solely from the warranty deed from 
the Stephens dated June 15, 1971. The appellant's Myrtle and Jack 
E. Burton's, water rights is likewise derivative, being derived 
solely from the warranty deed from the Stephens which was dated 
August 20, 1972. It is clear from the case and statutory law 
cited by appellants that the measure of appurtenant water rights 
is the amount of beneficial use at the time of the conveyance. 
It is also clear that when the deed is silent as to the reserva-
tion of any water rights, it is presumed that the grantor has con-
veyed all water rights which were appurtenant to the land convey-
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ed. Stephens testified he reserved no water rights. (Tr. 117) 
The deed to John and Sheryl Burton as grantees contained no res-
ervation of water rights* (Tr. 86) There was never any oral dis-
cussion of the reservation of any water rights by the Stephens. 
(Tr. 91) As to reversation of water rights, Stephens testified 
(Tr. 116) thus: 
Q. Let me ask you this, you didn't spec-
ficially, in writing, reserve any water rights, 
did you? 
A. No, sir. 
The respondents attempted to obtain an implied reservation 
without dealing with the clear and unambiguous language of the 
warranty deeds which are fatally lacking in any reservation lan-
guage . 
The warranty deeds clearly conveyed whatever rights the Ste-
phens had to water appurtenant to the land unless those rights 
were expressly reserved. Stephens failed to reserve any water 
rights, therefore, in accordance with both statutory and case law, 
all the water rights were coveyed by Stephens to the Burtons. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants respectfully submit that the judgment should 
be reserved and the respondents completely divested of any water 
rights. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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